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Abstract
Recent approaches to mobile code safety, like proof-carrying code, involve associating safety infor-
mation to programs. The code supplier provides a program and also includes with it a certiﬁcate
(or proof ) whose validity entails compliance with a predeﬁned safety policy. The intended beneﬁt
is that the program consumer can locally validate the certiﬁcate w.r.t. the “untrusted” program by
means of a certiﬁcate checker—a process which should be much simpler, eﬃcient, and automatic
than generating the original proof. We herein introduce a novel approach to mobile code safety
which follows a similar scheme, but which is based throughout on the use of abstract interpretation
techniques. In our framework the safety policy is speciﬁed by using an expressive assertion language
deﬁned over abstract domains. We identify a particular slice of the abstract interpretation-based
static analysis results which is especially useful as a certiﬁcate. The validity of the certiﬁcate on
the consumer side is checked by a very simpliﬁed and eﬃcient specialized abstract-interpreter. Our
ideas are illustrated through an example implemented in the context of constraint logic programs,
using the CiaoPP system. Though further experimentation is still required, we believe the pro-
posed approach is of interest for bringing the automation and expressiveness which is inherent in
the abstract interpretation techniques to the area of mobile code safety.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important challenges which computing research faces today
is the development of security techniques for verifying that the execution of
a program (possibly) supplied by an untrusted source is safe, i.e., it meets
certain properties according to a predeﬁned safety policy. Recent approaches
to mobile code safety involve associating safety information in the form of
a certiﬁcate to programs [13,11,12]. The certiﬁcate (or proof) is created at
compile time, and packaged along with the untrusted code. The consumer
who receives or downloads the code+certiﬁcate package can then run a veriﬁer
which by a straightforward inspection of the code and the certiﬁcate, can verify
the validity of the certiﬁcate and thus compliance with the safety policy.
The key beneﬁt of this “certiﬁcate-based” approach to mobile code safety
is that the burden of ensuring compliance with the desired safety policy is
shifted from the consumer to the supplier. The consumer’s task is reduced
from the level of proving to the level of checking. Indeed the veriﬁer, or proof
checker, performs a task that should be much simpler, eﬃcient, and automatic
than generating the original certiﬁcate. Well-known methods following this
approach are, among others, Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [13] and Typed
Assembly Languages (TAL) [12]. An interesting point to note is that the
certiﬁcate may take diﬀerent forms. For instance, in PCC the certiﬁcate is
originally a proof in ﬁrst-order logic of certain veriﬁcation conditions and
the veriﬁcation process involves checking that the certiﬁcate is indeed a valid
ﬁrst-order proof. A recent proposal [1] uses temporal logic to specify security
policies in PCC. In TAL, the certiﬁcate is a type annotation of the assembly
language program and the veriﬁcation process involves a form of type checking.
Nevertheless, the design of mobile code safety systems based on certiﬁcates
shares the same, fundamental, challenges:
(i) deﬁning expressive safety policies covering a wide range of properties,
(ii) solving the problem of how to automatically generate the certiﬁcates and,
(iii) designing simple, reliable, and eﬃcient checkers for the certiﬁcates.
The various approaches diﬀer in expressiveness, ﬂexibility, and eﬃciency, but
they all share the common goal of using safety information to make the local
execution of untrusted mobile code by the consumer safe and eﬃcient. Our
main contribution is to introduce a novel approach to certiﬁcate-based mobile
code safety which follows the overall scheme, but which is based throughout
on the use of the technique of abstract interpretation [3] in order to handle
the fundamental and diﬃcult issues mentioned above.
A starting point of our work is the observation that the now well estab-
E. Albert et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 132 (2005) 113–129114
lished technique of abstract interpretation has allowed the development of
very sophisticated global static program analyses which are at the same time
automatic, provably correct, and practical. The basic idea of abstract inter-
pretation is to infer information on programs by interpreting (“running”) them
using abstract values rather than concrete ones, thus, obtaining safe approx-
imations of programs behavior. The technique allows inferring much richer
information than, for example, traditional types. This includes data structure
shape (like pointer sharing), bounds on data structure sizes, and other oper-
ational variable instantiation properties, as well as procedure-level properties
such as determinacy, termination, non-failure, and bounds on resource con-
sumption (time or space cost). CiaoPP [7] is the abstract interpretation-based
preprocessor of the Ciao multi-paradigm constraint logic programming sys-
tem. It uses modular, incremental abstract interpretation as a fundamental
tool to obtain information about the program. In CiaoPP, the semantic ap-
proximations produced by the analysis have been applied to high- and low-level
optimizations during program compilation, including transformations such as
multiple abstract specialization, parallelization, and resource usage control.
More recently, novel and promising applications of such semantic approxima-
tions have been proposed in the more general context of program development.
In the context of the CiaoPP system, we herein introduce a novel approach
to mobile code safety which follows a certiﬁcate-based scheme, but which is
based throughout on the technique of abstract interpretation. The design of
our abstract interpretation-based system is made up of three main elements:
(i) An expressive assertion language used to deﬁne the safety policy. As-
sertions allow us to express “abstract”—i.e. symbolic—properties over
diﬀerent abstract domains. Our framework is parametric w.r.t. the ab-
stract domain of interest, which gives us generality and expressiveness.
(ii) A ﬁxpoint static analyzer is used to automatically infer information about
the mobile code which can then be used to prove that the code is safe
w.r.t. the given assertions in a straightforward way. We identify the
particular slice of the analysis results which is suﬃcient for this purpose.
(iii) A simple, easy-to-trust analysis checker veriﬁes the validity of the infor-
mation on the mobile code. It is indeed a specialized abstract interpreter
which does not need to iterate in order to reach a ﬁxpoint (in contrast
to standard analyzers). Eﬃciency is achieved by taking advantage of the
analysis information gathered in a previous analysis phase.
The resulting scheme has been incorporated in the CiaoPP preprocessor and
its eﬃciency is now in the process of being experimentally evaluated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the assertion lan-
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create_streams([],[]).
create_streams([N|NL],[F|FL]):-
number_codes(N,ChInN), generate(ChInN,Fname),
safe_open(Fname,write,F), create_streams(NL,FL).
generate(ChInN,Fname):- app("/tmp/",ChInN,Fname).
safe_open(Fname,Mode,Stream):-
atom_codes(File,Fname), open(File,Mode,Stream).
Fig. 1. Example mobile code
guage which is used to deﬁne our safety policy. Section 3 presents the certi-
ﬁcation process together with the generation of the veriﬁcation condition to
attest compliance with the safety policy. In Section 4, we outline the process
of checking the validity of the safety information. Finally, Section 5 discusses
the work presented in this paper together with related work.
2 An Assertion Language to Specify the Safety Policy
The purpose of a safety policy is to specify precisely the conditions under
which the execution of a program is considered safe. In existing approaches,
safety policies usually correspond to some variants of type safety (which may
also control the correct access of memory or array bounds [14]). We propose
the use of (a subset of) the high-level assertion language [15] available in
CiaoPP to deﬁne the safety policy in the context of constraint logic programs.
2.1 Preliminaries
We start by introducing some notation and preliminary concepts on constraint
logic programming [9] (CLP). Terms are constructed from variables (e.g., X),
functors (e.g., f) and predicates (e.g., p). We denote by {X1 → t1, . . . , Xn →
tn} the substitution σ with σ(Xi) = ti for all i = 1, . . . , n (with Xi = Xj
if i = j) and σ(X) = X for any other variable X, where ti are terms. A
renaming is a substitution ρ for which there exists the inverse ρ−1 such that
ρρ−1 ≡ ρ−1ρ ≡ id.
A constraint is essentially a conjunction of expressions built from prede-
ﬁned predicates (such as term equations or inequalities over the reals) whose
arguments are constructed using predeﬁned functions (such as real addition).
An atom has the form p(t1, ..., tn) where p is a predicate symbol and the ti are
terms. A literal is either an atom or a constraint. A goal is a ﬁnite sequence
of literals. A rule is of the form H:-B where H , the head, is an atom and
B, the body, is a possibly empty ﬁnite sequence of literals. A constraint logic
program, or program, is a ﬁnite set of rules.
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Example 2.1 Let us consider the CLP program in Figure 1. The main pred-
icate, create streams/2, receives a list of numbers as ﬁrst argument and
returns in the second argument the list of ﬁle handlers (streams) associated
to the opened ﬁles. Predicates number codes/2, atom codes/2, and open/3
are ISO-standard Prolog predicates, and thus they are available in CiaoPP.
In our example, the call number codes(N, ChInN) receives the number N and
returns in ChInN the list of the ASCII codes of the characters comprising a rep-
resentation of N. Also, the call atom codes(File, Fname) receives in Fname a
list of ASCII codes and returns the atom File made up of the corresponding
characters. A call open(File, Mode, Stream) opens the ﬁle named File and
returns in Stream the stream associated with the ﬁle. The argument Mode can
have any of the values: read, write, or append.
The auxiliary predicate generate concatenates the preﬁx “/tmp/” to the
number which receives as ﬁrst parameter by using the well-known list concate-
nation predicate app/3. Note that predicate create streams does not call
the system predicate open directly, but instead calls the auxiliary predicate
safe open. The reason for this will be discussed in Example 2.3.
2.2 Abstract Properties
Assertions are syntactic objects which allow expressing a wide variety of high-
level properties of (in our case CLP-) programs. Examples are assertions which
state information on entry points to a program module, assertions which de-
scribe properties of built-ins, assertions which provide some type declarations,
cost bounds, etc. A distinguishing feature of our approach is that safety
properties are expressed as substitutions in the context of an abstract domain
(Dα) which is simpler than the concrete domain (D). An abstract value is
a ﬁnite representation of a, possibly inﬁnite, set of actual values in the con-
crete domain. Our approach relies on the abstract interpretation theory [3],
where the set of all possible abstract semantic values which represents Dα is
usually a complete lattice or cpo which is ascending chain ﬁnite. However,
for this study, abstract interpretation is restricted to complete lattices over
sets, both for the concrete 〈2D,⊆〉 and abstract 〈Dα,〉 domains. Abstract
values and sets of concrete values are related via a pair of monotonic map-
pings 〈α, γ〉: abstraction α : 2D → Dα, and concretization γ : Dα → 2
D, such
that ∀x ∈ 2D : γ(α(x)) ⊇ x and ∀y ∈ Dα : α(γ(y)) = y. In general  is
induced by ⊆ and α. Similarly, the operations of least upper bound (unionsq) and
greatest lower bound () mimic those of 2D in a precise sense.
In this framework an abstract property is deﬁned as an abstract substitution
which allows us to express properties, in terms of an abstract domain, that
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:- regtype safe_name/1.
safe_name("/tmp/"||L) :- list(L,alphanum_code).
:- regtype alphanum_code/1.
alphanum_code(X):- alpha_code(X).
alphanum_code(X):- num_code(X).
:- regtype alpha_code/1.
alpha_code(A):- member(A,"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwzyz").
alpha_code(A):- member(A,"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ").
:- regtype num_code/1.
num_code(C):- member(C,"0123456789").
Fig. 2. Regular types for the example
the execution of a program must satisfy.
The description domain that we use in our examples is a regular type do-
main [4]. We will often refer to this domain as eterms [19] since it is the name
it has in CiaoPP. A regular type is a set of terms which can be described by
a regular term grammar or, equivalently, by a ﬁnite tree automaton. In order
to deﬁne a regular type, one can choose Regular Unary Logic programs as a
representation of tree automata (like [5,6]). We also adopt this representation
as Ex. 2.2 will illustrate. Abstract substitutions in the eterms domain over a
set of variables V assign a regular type to each variable in V . Apart from the
user’s deﬁned regular types, in the eterms domain, we consider a number of
distinguished symbols which correspond to predeﬁned types. For instance, we
will use in our examples term, which is the most general type, i.e., it corre-
sponds to all possible terms. The type constant denotes functors with zero
arguments, num, the set of all possible numbers, string, lists of characters,
list, any possible list, io term the modes of accessing ﬁles (i.e., write, read
or append), and stream, handlers for sequential ﬁles. We allow parametric
types such as list(T) which denotes lists whose elements are all of type T.
Note that the type list is equivalent to list(term). Clearly, list(T) 
list  term for any type T. In eterms, the most general substitution  as-
signs term to all variables in V . The least general substitution ⊥ assigns the
empty set of values to each variable. For brevity, in the examples we often
skip variables whose type is the most general substitution (i.e., term).
Example 2.2 In the context of mobile code, it is a safety issue whether the
code tries to access ﬁles which are not related to the application in the machine
consuming the code. A very simple safety policy can be to enforce that the
mobile code only accesses temporary ﬁles. For example, in a UNIX system this
can be controlled (under some assumptions) by ensuring that the ﬁle resides
in the directory /tmp/.
The Regular Unary Logic program safe name in Figure 2 deﬁnes a reg-
ular type such that all its values satisfy this very simple notion of safety.
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The following abstract property made up of the abstract substitution {X →
safe name} expresses that X be bound to a string which starts by the preﬁx
“/tmp/” followed by a list of alpha-numerical characters. In the following, we
write simply safe name(X) to represent the previous abstract substitution.
The regtype declarations are used to deﬁne new regular types in CiaoPP. In
fact, auxiliary predicates used to deﬁne a regular type, like alphanum code,
alpha code, or num code must be declared using regtype as well. The con-
struction member(C,"0123456789") is a shortcut for expressing that C can
correspond to any of the codes in the list from character 0 to 9.
2.3 The Safety Policy
The original assertion language [15] available in CiaoPP is composed of several
assertion schemes. Among them, we simply consider the two following schemes
for the purpose of this paper, which intuitively correspond to the traditional
pre- and postcondition on procedures.
calls(B, {λ1Pre; . . . ;λ
n
Pre}): They express properties which should hold in any
call to a given predicate similarly to the traditional precondition. B is a
predicate descriptor, i.e., it has a predicate symbol as main functor and all
arguments are distinct free variables, and λiP re, i = 1, . . . , n, are abstract
properties about execution states. The resulting assertion should be inter-
preted as “in all activations of B at least one property λiP re should hold in
the calling state.”
success(B, [λPre, ]λPost): This assertion schema is used to describe a post-
condition which must hold on all success states for a given predicate. In
the assertion, B is a predicate descriptor, and λPre and λPost are abstract
properties about execution states. λPre is optional and must be evaluated
w.r.t. the store at the calling state to the predicate. However, the condition
λPost must be evaluated w.r.t. the store at the success state of the predicate.
If the optional λPre is present, then λPost is only required to hold in those
success states which correspond to call states satisfying λPre. Note that
several success assertions with diﬀerent λPre may be given.
Therefore, abstract properties λPre and λPost in assertions allow us to express
conditions, in terms of an abstract domain, that the execution of a program
must satisfy. Each condition is an abstract substitution corresponding to the
variables in some atom.
In general, it is the task of the compiler designer to deﬁne the safety policy
associated to the system. In the CiaoPP precompiler, the above assertion
language allows us to deﬁne the safety policy for the run-time system in the
presence of foreign functions, built-ins, etc.
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calls(number codes(X,Y), {(num(X);list(Y,numcodes))})
calls(atom codes(X,Y), {(constant(X);string(Y))})
calls(open(X,Y, Z), {constant(X),io mode(Y)})
calls(safe open(Fname, , ), {safe name(Fname)})
success(number codes(X,Y), , {num(X),list(Y,numcodes)})
success(atom codes(X,Y),, {constant(X),string(Y)})
success(open(X,Y,Z), , {constant(X),io mode(Y),stream(Z)})
Fig. 3. Assertions for the example
Example 2.3 Figure 3 shows the assertions which are relevant to the program
in our running example. The ﬁrst four rows correspond to calls assertions,
whereas the last three are success assertions. Out of the four calls, the ﬁrst
three are predeﬁned in the system. The last user-deﬁned assertion for predi-
cate safe open provides a simple way to guarantee that all calls to open are
safe. It can be read as “the calling conventions for predicate safe open require
that the ﬁrst argument be a safe name”. Let us note that the actual imple-
mentation in the CiaoPP system also includes program point assertions [15]
which avoid the use of auxiliary predicates such as this one. For simplicity,
we do not discuss program point assertions here. The safety policy in our
example corresponds to guaranteeing that the program satisﬁes all the seven
assertions in the ﬁgure.
The coexistence of diﬀerent domains in CiaoPP [7] allows expressing a wide
range of properties using the assertion language. They include modes, types,
non-failure, termination, determinacy, non-suspension, non-ﬂoundering and
cost bounds and their combinations. This idea is related to the notion of
models addressed in the work on Model-Carrying Code (MCC) [18] to capture
the security-relevant properties of code. MCC enables code consumers to try
out diﬀerent security policies of interest and select one that can be statically
proved to be consistent with the model associated to the untrusted code. In
our framework, the coexistence of diﬀerent domains recalls the existence of
various models in MCC. However, models are intended to describe low-level
properties and their combination has not been approached, which diﬀers from
our idea of combining (high-level) abstract domains.
In contrast to other approaches, assertions are not compulsory for every
predicate. This is important since assertions have to be provided manually.
Thus, the user can decide how much eﬀort to put into writing assertions:
the more of them there are, the more complete the partial correctness of the
program is described and more possibilities to detect problems. However,
pre- and post-conditions are often provided by programmers since they are
often easy to write and very useful for generating program documentation.
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Furthermore, assertions are helpful but not actually required in order to obtain
information about the program: the analysis algorithm is able to obtain safe
approximations of the program behavior even if no assertions are given. This is
not always the case in other approaches such as classical program veriﬁcation,
in which loop invariants are actually required. Such invariants are hard to ﬁnd
and existing automated techniques are generally not suﬃcient to infer them,
so that often they have to be provided by hand.
3 Certifying Programs by Static Analysis
This section describes the certiﬁcation process, i.e., the generation of a certiﬁ-
cate to attest the adherence of the program to the safety policy. The whole
certiﬁcation method is based on the following idea: a particular slice of the
analysis results computed by abstract interpretation-based ﬁxpoint algorithms
can play the role of certiﬁcate for attesting program safety. Intuitively, our
certiﬁcation process performs the following steps. We start from a set, AS, of
assertions which establishes the safety policy associated to a program, P , in
the context of an abstract domain, Dα, as deﬁned in Sect. 2. Firstly, a stan-
dard program analyzer is run, which returns, among other data structures, an
answer table, AT , encoding relevant information about P ’s execution (in terms
of the abstract domain Dα). Secondly, a veriﬁcation condition, V C(AS,AT ),
is generated from AS and AT in order to attest compliance of P with respect
to the safety policy. The condition V C(AS,AT ) is sent to an automatic veri-
ﬁer which attempts to validate it. If it succeeds, AT constitutes the certiﬁcate
and can be sent to the consumer together with the program P . Sections 3.1
and 3.2 give further details on elements AT and V C(AS,AT ), respectively.
3.1 Using Analysis Results as Certiﬁcates
A main idea in our certiﬁcation process is that the certiﬁcate is automatically
generated by a ﬁxpoint abstract interpretation-based analyzer. In particular,
we rely on the goal dependent (a.k.a. goal oriented) analyzer of [8] which is the
one implemented in the CiaoPP system. This analysis algorithm (we simply
write Analysis for short in the following) receives as input, in addition to
the program P , a set of calling patterns. A calling pattern is a description of
the calling modes (or entries) into the program. In particular, for an abstract
domain Dα, a set of calling patterns Q consists of a set of pairs of the form
〈A : CP 〉 where A is a predicate descriptor and CP is an abstract substitu-
tion (i.e., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A expressed as CP ∈ Dα.
In principle, calling patterns are only required for exported predicates. The
analysis algorithm is able to generate them automatically for the remaining
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internal predicates. Nevertheless, they can still be automatically generated by
assuming  as the abstract substitution (i.e., no initial information is given)
for all exported predicates. Although the idea is to improve this information
by means of the initial calling patterns.
In order to compute Analysis(P,Q,Dα), traditional (goal dependent) ab-
stract interpreters for (C)LP programs construct an and–or graph (or analysis
graph for short) which corresponds to (or approximates) the abstract seman-
tics of the program [2]. The graph has two sorts of nodes: or–nodes and
and–nodes. Or–nodes correspond to literals whilst and–nodes to rules. Both
kinds of nodes are connected as follows. Or–nodes have arcs to those and–
nodes which correspond to the rules whose head uniﬁes with the literal. An
and–node for a rule H :– B1, . . . , Bn has n arcs to the or–nodes which corre-
sponds to the literals in the body of the rule. Due to space limitations, and
given that it is now well understood, we do not describe here how to compute
the and–or graph, or equivalently, Analysis(P,Q,Dα). More details can be
found in, e.g., [2,8,16].
The analysis graph computed by CiaoPP’s abstract interpreter is repre-
sented by means of two data structures in the output: the answer table and the
arc dependency table. The following deﬁnition introduces the notion of analy-
sis table (similar deﬁnitions can be found, e.g., in [2,8,16]). Informally, it says
that its entries are of the form 〈A : CP → AP〉 which should be interpreted
as “the answer pattern for calls satisfying precondition (or call substitution),
CP, to A accomplishes postcondition (or success substitution), AP.”
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Analysis answer table] Let P be a program. Let Q be a set
of calling patterns expressed in the abstract domain Dα. We deﬁne an analysis
answer table, AT , as the set of entries 〈Aj : CPj → APj〉, ∀j = 1..n computed
by Analysis(P,Q,Dα)[8] where, in each entry, Aj is an atom and CPj and
APj are, respectively, the abstract call and success substitutions.
Intuitively, the answer table contains the answer patterns for all literals
in the or–nodes of the graph while the arc dependency table keeps detailed
information about dependencies among or–nodes in the graph. A central
idea in this work is that, for certifying program safety, it suﬃces to send the
information stored in the analysis answer table since, in contrast to the original
generic algorithm [8], a simple analysis checker can be designed for validating
the answer table without requiring the use of the arc dependency table at all
(as we show in Sect. 4). The theory of abstract interpretation guarantees that
the answer table is a safe approximation of the runtime behavior (see [2,8,16]
for details).
Example 3.2 Reconsider the program of Example 2.1 and the abstract do-
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main eterms enhanced with the regular type declaration safe name of Ex-
ample 2.2. Take the calling pattern 〈create streams(X, Y), {list(X, num)}〉,
which indicates that initial calls to create streams are performed with a list
of numbers in the ﬁrst argument. CiaoPP computes this answer table for it:
Predicate Calling Pattern Success Pattern
create streams(A,B) list(A,num) list(A, num),list(B, stream)
number codes(A,B) num(A) num(A),list(B,numcodes)
generate(A,B) list(A,numcodes) list(A,numcodes),sf(B)
app(A,B,C) A="/tmp/", A="/tmp/",
list(B,numcodes) list(B,numcodes),sf(C)
safe open(A,B,C) sf(A),B=write sf(A),B=write,stream(B)
atom codes(A,B) sf(B) constant(A),sf(B)
open(A,B,C) constant(A), constant(A),B=write,
B=write stream(C)
For instance, the ﬁrst entry should be interpreted as: all calls to predicate
create streams provide as input a list of numbers in the ﬁrst argument and,
upon success, they yield lists of numbers and streams, respectively, in each of
its two arguments. It is interesting to note that CiaoPP generates the auxiliary
type sf("/tmp/"||A) :- list(A,numcodes). to represent lists of numbers
starting by the preﬁx "/tmp/". Clearly, sf  safe name. This will allow
CiaoPP to infer that calls to open performed within this program satisfy
the simple safety policy discussed in Ex. 2.2. Moreover, we use the notation
V ar = constant to denote that the system generates a new type whose only
element is this constant, as it happens: for write, in the entries for safe open
and open and, for "/tmp/", in the entry for app.
In order to increase accuracy, analyzers are usually multivariant on calls
(see, e.g., [8]). Indeed, though not visible in this example, CiaoPP incorpo-
rates a multivariant analysis, i.e., more than one triple 〈A : CP1 → AP1〉,. . .,
〈A : CPn → APn〉 n > 1 with CPi = APi for some i, j may be computed for
the same predicate descriptor A.
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3.2 The Veriﬁcation Condition
In the next step, the code supplier extracts a Veriﬁcation Condition (VC)
which can be proved only if the execution of the code does not violate the
safety policy. For an initial set of assertions, we deﬁne our VC as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Veriﬁcation Condition] Let P be a program, Q a set of calling
patterns in the abstract domain Dα and AT its analysis answer table. Let S
be an assertion. Then, the veriﬁcation condition, V C(S,AT ), for S w.r.t. AT
is deﬁned as follows:
V C(S,AT ) ::=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∧
〈A:CP →AP 〉∈AT
(ρ(CP )  λ1Prec ∨ . . . ∨ ρ(CP )  λ
n
Prec)
if S = calls(B, {λ1Prec; . . . ;λ
n
Prec})
∧
〈A:CP →AP 〉∈AT
ρ(CP )  λPrec = ⊥ ∨ ρ(AP )  λPost
if S = success(B, λPrec, λPost)
where ρ is a variable renaming substitution of A w.r.t. B.
If AS is a ﬁnite set of assertions, then its veriﬁcation condition, V (AS,AT ),
is the conjunction of the veriﬁcation conditions of the elements of AS.
Roughly speaking, the VC generated according to Def. 3.3 is a conjunc-
tion of boolean expressions (possibly containing disjunctions) whose validity
ensures the consistency of a set of assertions w.r.t. the answer table computed
by Analysis. It distinguishes two diﬀerent cases depending on the kind of
assertion. For calls assertions, the VC requires that at least one precondition
λiP rec be a safe approximation of all existing abstract calling patterns for the
atom B. In the case of success assertions, there are two cases for them to hold.
The ﬁrst one indicates that the precondition is never satisﬁed and, thus, the
assertion trivially holds (and the postcondition does not need to be tested).
The second corresponds to the case in which the success substitutions com-
puted by analysis for the predicate are more particular than the one required
by the assertion. Let us illustrate this deﬁnition by means of an example.
Example 3.4 Consider the answer table generated in Example 3.2 and the
calls and success assertions of Figure 3. According to Def. 3.3, the VC is:
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(num(X)  (num(X); list(Y, numcodes))∧
sf(Y)  (constant(X); string(Y))∧
constant(X), Y = write  constant(X), io mode(Y)∧
sf(X)  safe name(X)∧
num(X), list(Y, numcodes)  num(X), list(Y, numcodes)∧
constant(X), sf(Y)  constant(X), string(Y)∧
constant(X), Y = write, stream(Z)  constant(X), io mode(Y), stream(Z))
Each conjunct corresponds to an assertion in Fig. 3 in the same order they
appear there. Thus, the ﬁrst four conjuncts are for the calls assertions and
the last three for the success assertions. The validity of the whole conjunction
can be easily proved by taking into account the following (trivial) relations
between the elements in the domain:
sf(X)  string(X)
X = write  io mode(X)
Note that the ﬁrst two conjuncts contain a disjunction in the right condition.
In the second one, the condition sf(Y)  (constant(X); string(Y)) holds
because sf(Y)  string(Y).
Therefore, upon creating the answer table and generating the VC, the
validity of the whole boolean condition is checked by resolving each conjunct
separately. Note that each conjunct consists of comparisons of pairs of abstract
substitutions, which simply return either true or false but do not compute
any substitution. This validation may yield three diﬀerent possible status:
i) the VC is indeed checked, as it happens in the above example; ii) it is
disproved, and thus the certiﬁcate is not valid and the code is deﬁnitely not
safe to run (we should obviously correct the program before continuing the
process); iii) it cannot be proved nor disproved, which may be due to several
circumstances. For instance, it can happen that the analysis is not able to infer
precise enough information to verify the conditions. The user can then provide
a more reﬁned description of initial calling patterns or choose a diﬀerent, ﬁner-
grained, domain. In both the ii) and iii) cases the certiﬁcation process needs
to be restarted until achieving a VC which meets i).
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4 Checking Safety in the Consumer
After certifying the safety of the code, the supplier sends the program together
with the certiﬁcate to the consumer. To retain the safety guarantees, the
consumer can trust neither the code nor the certiﬁcate. Thus, in the validation
process, a code consumer not only checks the validity of the certiﬁcate w.r.t.
the program but it also (re-)generates a trustworthy VC. This section describes
only the former part of the validation process, since the latter is identical to
that already discussed in the previous section.
There are at least three reasons for requiring the validation process to be
eﬃcient and driven by a simple algorithm. First, the implementation of the
checking algorithm is part of the safety-critical infrastructure and we want
to minimize it. Second, the local host could be a small embedded system
that lacks computing resources to run large and complex programs. Third,
the checking will be performed by every consumer (whilst the certiﬁcation
generation is done only once by the supplier).
As already mentioned, Analysis plays the role of the certiﬁcate gener-
ator in our approach. Although global analysis is now routinely used as
a practical tool, it is still unacceptable to run the whole Analysis to vali-
date the certiﬁcate since it still involves considerable cost. One of the main
reasons for this is that the ﬁxpoint algorithm is an iterative process which
often recomputes answers (repeatedly) for the same call due to possible up-
dates introduced by further computations. At each iteration, the algorithm
has to manipulate rather complex data structures—which involve performing
updates, lookups, etc.—until the ﬁxpoint is reached. The whole validation
process is centered around the following observation: the checking algorithm
can be deﬁned as a very simpliﬁed “one-traversal” analyzer. Intuitively, the
computation of a ﬁxpoint algorithm, such as Analysis, can be understood as:
Analysis = fixpoint(analysis step). We write explicitly fixpoint to high-
light that the analysis can be seen as an iterative process which repeatedly
performs a traversal of the analysis graph (denoted by analysis step) until the
computed information does not change, i.e., it reaches a ﬁxpoint. The idea is
that the simple, non-iterative, analysis step process can play the role of ab-
stract interpretation-based checker. In other words, check ≡ analysis step.
This is justiﬁed by the assumption that the certiﬁcation process already pro-
vides the ﬁxpoint result in the form of certiﬁcate. Thus, as long as the answer
table is valid, an additional analysis pass over it—or equivalently one single
execution of analysis step—cannot change the result.
A similar approach is also taken in the veriﬁcation of Java bytecode [11,10]
in the context of embedded systems. As it is done in PCC, the work in [17]
proposes to split bytecode veriﬁcation of the KVM (an embedded variant of
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the JVM) in two phases: 1) the producer computes the certiﬁcate by means of
a type-based dataﬂow analyzer and 2) then the consumer simply checks that
the types provided in the code certiﬁcate are valid. As it happens in our case,
the second phase can be done in a single, linear pass over the bytecode.
5 Discussion
The idea of using the results of abstract interpretation for program veriﬁcation
and debugging is not new. For instance, a dataﬂow analysis applied to a type-
level abstract interpretation of the Java virtual machine is the basis of all
existing bytecode veriﬁers [11,10]. Analysis results allow proving that the
program is correct w.r.t. non-trivial correctness conditions. This is also the
case in CiaoPP, whose combination of abstract interpretation with a ﬂexible
assertion language opens the door to many uses of abstract interpretation for
program development.
In this paper, we have introduced a novel approach to mobile code safety
which follows the standard strategy of associating safety certiﬁcates to pro-
grams, proposed by PCC and related techniques, but which is based through-
out on the use of abstract interpretation. In particular, it diﬀers from PCC
in the following aspects. In our case, the burden on the consumer side is
reduced by replacing an analysis phase with a simple one-traversal abstract
interpretation-based checker. The certiﬁcate takes the form of a particular
slice of the analysis results generated by an abstract interpreter. The cer-
tiﬁcate checker on the consumer side is itself in fact a very simpliﬁed and
eﬃcient specialized abstract-interpreter. The importance of our deﬁnition of
the checker comes from the fact that, while abstract interpretation is a pow-
erful technique, in return it is not without cost: the results it provides are
guaranteed to be correct and often suﬃciently precise in order to be useful,
but obtaining analysis results is a costly task, mainly due to the fact that an
analysis ﬁxpoint has to be reached. The checker that we have proposed, on
the other hand, greatly reduces the cost on the receiving side.
Another notable diﬀerence is that that our scheme is completely deﬁned
at the source-level, whereas in PCC and related approaches the code supplier
typically packages the certiﬁcate with the untrusted object code rather than
with the source code. From our point of view these two approaches are of
interest. In many cases the source code is simply not available to the consumer.
Even when there is a choice between object and source code, using object code
has the clear advantage that the trusted computing base in the consumer is
reduced since there is no need for a compiler. However, open-source code
is getting much more relevant these days. As a result, it is now realistic to
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expect that a relatively large amount of untrusted source code is available
to the consumer. Part of our interest in open-source is due to the fact that
Ciao is itself a GNU-Licensed Prolog System based on the availability of the
source code for its reviewing and modiﬁcation. The advantages of open-source
with respect to safety are important since it allows inspecting the code and
applying powerful techniques for program analysis and validation which allow
inferring information which may be diﬃcult to observe at low-level, compiled
code. This enables handling more involved properties which in turn allow
more expressive safety policies. Therefore, we share with PCC the idea of
reducing the load in the consumer but our method is somehow applied in a
diﬀerent manner.
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